

E# 838

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Affidavit of a Witness

March 25, 1946 at Khabarovsk

I, Colonel IVANOV, Assistant Prosecutor for U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, interrogated the undermentioned person; through an interpreter 2nd Lt. PETROV, as a witness after warning him that he would be responsible under Art. No. 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. if he made any false statements.

1. Name: KISABA, Tatsumi
2. Age: born in 1888. 58 years
3. Official position: Ex-Commander of the Continental Railway
- p.2 4. Political Party: nil
5. Present address: Khabarovsk

Attached certificate of the responsibility of a witness regarding false statement and also a certificate of the official interpreter regarding false interpretation with this interrogatory of a witness.

This interrogation has been made in the Japanese language through the interpretation of 2nd Lt. PETROV.

p.3 Q. When, and by whom were you appointed to the Commander of the Continental Railway?

A. At the date of December 16th, 1944, I was appointed the commander of the Continental Railway by His Majesty.

Q. Have you ever participated in the Manchuria Railway?

A. Yes, after the Manchurian Incident. I have participated in it as the head of the Sixth Section of the Third Division of the General Staff Office (the head of the Section of Railway), from the 6th year of Showa /1931/ to the 8th year of Showa /1933/. In the 6th year of Showa /1931/ the head of the Third Division was, Major-General OKI and in the 7th year of Showa /1932/ Major General OBATA.

Q. When did you have relation to the leadership of the Manchurian Railways?

A. From 10th year of Showa /1935/ to 12th year of Showa /1937/ I had connection with the leading of the South Manchurian Railway as an adviser attached to the South Manchurian Railway and belonging

to the staff of the KWANTUNG Army. And I took the charge of the connection between the KWANTUNG Army, the government of Manchuria and the head office of the South Manchurian Railway Company. At that time I took the position in the general Bureau of the South Manchurian Railway Company in Mukden. At that time the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army was General MINAMI Jiro, and the Chief of the staff of this army was Lieutenant-General NISHIO Juzo.

p. 4 Q From and to what time were you on active service?

A I was on active service from 1908 to 1944 and on December, 1st, 1944, I was ordered to go into reserve.

Q What kind of military education did you get?

A In 1915 I had graduated from the staff college.

Q From what year did you specialize in the railway relations?

A From 1916.

Q Before the Manchurian occupation, that is to say before 1931, has the government of Japan ever carried out the construction of strategic railways in Manchuria?

A. Yes, it has.

Q Before the Manchurian occupation in 1931, had any strategic railways been constructed in Manchuria on Japanese funds?

p.5 A Yes, there was. The railway between Ssuninghai - Taonan - Angongchi was built in 1929, and its length was 500 kilometres long.

Q Where is the strategic point of this railway? Tell me.

A. This railway can transport promptly the Japanese forces staying on Manchurian Railway Main Line to the direction of Tsitsihar and cut off the East China Railway, and besides it is convenient to transport the troops in the direction of outer Mongolia via Selun from Taonan. In 1931, at the time of the Manchurian incident this railway was utilized for the transportation of the Japanese forces.

Q. Before 1931, was there any other railways built in Manchuria?

p. 6 A. In 1928, Changchun-Kirin-Tunkua Railway was built by the South Manchurian Railway Company. It was constructed as the first step of Kirin-Hweining Railway which is one of the Five Railways of Manchuria and Mongolia, and it is convenient for making the Japanese troops in Korea advance promptly in the direction of Khabin. At the time of the Manchurian incident this railway was utilized for transportation of Japanese forces.

Q. What are the Five Railways of Manchuria and Mongolia and their strategic meanings?

A. They are as follows:--

1. Ssupingkal-Taonan Railway
2. Taonan-Tsitsihar Railway
3. Kirin-Hweining Railway
4. Tsitsihar-Talai Railway
5. Changchun-Talai

p. 7 Japan got the concession to lay these railways in the 21 Items Treaty of Japan against China in 1915. I already explained the strategic meanings of 1,2,3. Tsitsihar-Meiho Railway is convenient for carrying troops which could cut off Heilung Railway. Changchun-Talai Railway is convenient for making advance the Japanese troops in Korea promptly to the direction of Tsitsihar via the established Changchun-Kirin Railway and Kirin-Hweining Line.

Q. Before 1931 what railways were built besides them?

A. In 1929, Mukden-Hailung-Kirin Railway was completed by Chinese North-East government.

Q. Did it do good for Japan?

A. It brought the benefit to Japan from the strategic point of view. Japan utilized it for carrying her troops at the time of the Manchurian incident.

Q. Don't you think that the suggestion of constructing this railway was made by Japanese General Staff?

p. 8 A. I don't know whether Japanese General Staff participated in it or not, though it was a benefit to Japan. In 1926 Kinchou-Fitzuro Railway was built on Japanese private companies funds, but it has no strategic meaning. In 1930, Hulutao-Koupangtze-Tahusken-Tungliao Railway was constructed

by Chinese North-East government, and the length of this railway is about 400 Kilometres and it had strategic importance for Japan after the Manchurian incident.

Q. What do you think of the reason why the activities of some Manchurian prominent men on the construction of this railway were in to the Japanese advantage?

A. At the time of the construction of the railway they were of anti-Japanese attitude.

Q. What did you hear of the TANAKA plan?

A. I have heard that TANAKA wanted to accomplish the Japanese continental advance policy, basing on Manchuria and Mongolia.

p. 9 Q. From whom have you heard of it?

A. I knew it through newspapers and from my friends.

Q. Did this plan intend to occupy Manchuria?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. During the term from 1927 to 1931 who of the Japanese politicians participated most actively in the strategic policy which was carried on in Manchuria?

A. The TANAKA cabinet. At the time of the TANAKA cabinet the special service agency were organized and set in Mukden.

Q. Is the intelligence service agency regarded to have been set for the preparation of the Manchurian occupation?

A. The special service agency was necessary for the collection of Manchurian information and for the observation of the schemes of Chinese North-East Government.

p.10 Q. What part did those railways which were constructed in Manchuria from 1927 to 1929 by Japan, perform at the time of Manchurian incident?

A. They performed an important part in transporting Japanese troops against Manchuria in the time of 1931.

Q. Who of the Japanese prominent persons do you think is responsible for these policies of Manchurian occupation

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- A. General HONJO, Shigeru, the commander of the KWANTUNG Army at that time is responsible for the happening of Manchurian incident. At that time, his headquarters was in Luchun. Manchurian incident was operated following the plan made by HONJO, Shigeru.
- Q. What kind of part did the commander of the Japanese Korean Army take and by whose direction was he put in motion?
- A. The commander of the Korean Army, General HAYASHI, Senjuro made the 20th Division cross the border on his own responsibility. The leading of the battle in the actual place was operated by Lieutenant General TAMON, Jiro, the commander of the Second Division under the KWANTUNG Army.
- Q. Who was the Prime Minister at that time?
- A. WAKATSUKI, Reiji was Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs was SPIDELER, Kijuro, and the Minister of War was MINAMI Jiro and the Chief of the General Staff was KANAYA, Hanzo.
- Q. What attitude did they take towards the Manchurian incident?
- A. They wanted the activities of Japanese troops to be limited only to the self-defence of railway lines. But both General MINAMI Jiro and the Chief of the General Staff KANAYA Hanzo wanted the Manchurian occupation.
- Q. How can you know that MINAMI Jiro took the leading part regarding the Manchurian occupation?
- p.12 A. He did not emphasis the stoppage of the Japanese forces' activities of hostilities. On the contrary he required the increase of forces in Manchuria and supported the advance of Japanese forces into various places in Manchuria.
- Q. To whom did he emphasis?
- A. He reported with the Chief of the general staff to His Majesty on the increase of Japanese troops against Manchuria and the spreading of the war zone.
- Q. Could MINAMI, Jiro carry on that policy and complete the Manchurian occupation?

- A Since Manchuria was occupied practically, the plan of the War Minister was completely carried on. The Minister of War, MIYAKI Jiro carried on this plan with the co-operation with KAWAYA Hanzo.
- Q What sort of recognition could those people get from His Majesty as to the activities of Manchurian occupation and among them who received the gratitude and were decorated?
- p. 13 A The Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff received the gratitude from His Majesty and received the special favours of being decorated.
- Q Tell me the activities and the parts ISHIMURA, Kanji, DOIHARA Kenji, and ITAGAKI Seishiro played in planning and carrying on the Manchurian occupation?
- A ITAGAKI took the part of leading on the planning and carrying on the Manchurian occupation as a high staff officer. ISHIMURA took the part in drawing up operation orders as the head of the operation section and of leading the battle at the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian incident. DOIHARA co-operated with them in the construction of independent Manchuria as the head of the special service agency in Mukden.
- Q Did the latter instigate this incident directly?
- A I don't know well, but I suppose he might have been connected with this event directly as he was the head of the special service agency.
- p.14 Q For what purpose was the Manchurian occupation carried out by Japan?
- A Politically, its purpose was to obtain right for Japan of a leading monopolization in Manchuria.
- Q Only in Manchuria?
- A At that time it was only in Manchuria.
- Q And after that time?
- A After that, the idea occurred to them that it would be convenient to make an invasion into the territories of China and the U.S.S.R. through Manchuria as a strategic point.

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Q Who agreed with this opinion?

p. 15 A TANAKA Gideki, ARAKI Sadao, TOJO Hideki, ITAGAKI Seishiro, MATSUOKA Yosuke, SUGAYAMA Gen, HAYASHI Senjuro, KONOE Fumimaro, OSHIMA Tiyoshi, MINAMI Jiro, and many others, and their activities were concentrated in attacking the territories of the U.S.S.R., China, and the Republic of Outer Mongolia, and they also urged the occupation of the South Sea islands by Japanese forces. According to newspaper accounts and my friends' gossip ARAKI Sadao and UGAKI Issai made a plan to turn the Japan Sea as an inland sea of Japan, that is to say, they were planning to occupy the Maritime Province, which is the territory of the U.S.S.R. They also urged Japanese political predominance all over East Asia as positive policy. These people pointed out that the Ural Mountains would be the limit of Japanese predominance.

Q Have you met Mr. MATSUOKA?

A Yes, while I was an adviser of the South Manchurian Railway Company, he was the President of the company. This was from 1936 to 1937.

p. 16 Q What ideas does MATSUOKA hold in regard to the occupation of territory in the U.S.S.R.?

A Mr. MATSUOKA often used to sing: 'Let the flag of Rising Sun wave over the Ural Mountains' at the banquets he attended. I also have been present at banquets given by the South Manchurian Railway Company.

Q What railway was constructed in Manchuria after the Manchurian occupation?

A In 1933 Kirin-Fweining line, in 1934 the Line from Roshin to Tumen to Mutankiang were built. Kirin-Fweining Line is convenient to carry the Japanese forces who are to be sent from the interior of Japan to continent, to the direction of Farbin promptly. And RASFIN-Tumen-Mutankiang Line is convenient to transport the forces promptly to the border of the U.S.S.R. and Manchuria. Since the military utilization of the established railways were paid the great attention and from about 1936 the whole attention was paid to the construction of the strategic railway.

p. 17 Q Haven't the railway towards the shore of Amur River established in 1936 any direct strategic meaning?

A At the time of the Manchurian incident, the construction of railways were chiefly carried out in the middle Manchurian zone, and after there, in the North and east Manchurian zone. For example, Mutankiang-Linkou Futou Line--this railway has the important strategic meaning. The plan of this railway was made before 1934. In 1932-1933 the Lafa-Harbin-Paian-Heihe Line, and the Paian-Tsitsihar Line--these railways are convenient to carry promptly the forces to the north, so that they have the important strategic meaning. The Paichientzu-Solun-Halonarshan Line was planned in 1933 and was built in four year. The strategic meaning of this railway is clear from the fact that lead to the border of Manchuria and Mongolia. The construction of the Changchun-Paichientzu line was begun in 1933 and the construction of the Linkou-Chiamussu-Suihua line in 1935 and in the same year, the Suiyang-Tungning-Langching line was also begun to be constructed. The latter railway pointed out to the direction of Vovoshilov, and has the important strategic meaning. The direction of Vovoshilov is the direction of the important point of attacking. In 1939 and 1940, the Hsiachientzu-Lishuchen-Chining-Mishan Line was constructed. It has a great strategic meaning as the connecting line of the railway for Vovoshilov and the railway for Iman. In 1941 the Tangpichen branch line from Tungan to Turi-kog was constructed. In 1940, the Hunchun-Tumentzu line was constructed. This railway has a great strategic meaning as it points out the direction of Barabash and Vladivostok. Those above mentioned railways were all constructed till 1941. In 1943, railways for Blagoveshchensk were constructed.

From 1935 to 1940 three main lines from Korea to Manchuria were constructed. One is the Kanko Sei-sin Tumen-Mutankiang-Linkou-Tungan line and other is the Heijo-Kanko-Manpuchen-Tunghua-Ssupingkaï line and the rest is the established Fuchan-Antung-Mukden line.

These three main lines were convenient to carry promptly the forces for any way in Manchuria from south Korea. If one of them became useless, it does not effect to the others and can change the forces into other lines, and the most valuable line which could carry on this changing is the Heijo-Genzan Line.

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Q Were the Manchurian railways, which provide Japan with her military base in that country, based on the plans made by the General Staff Headquarters of the Japanese Army?

p. 20 A Yes, they are based on the plans drawn up by Japanese General Staff.

Q Were the plans of Japanese General Staff made by the Strategic Transportation Section?

A The plans were conceived in the Operations Department, and their technical details were the responsibility of No. 3 Department. The Operations Department has neither the personnel nor materials necessary to draw up such plans, but only presented drafts to No. 3 Department, which then made practical plans and introduced them to the War Ministry as the opinion of the General Staff. The War Ministry negotiated with the Cabinet, and with their approval, passed the plan on to the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Army made out a practical scheme on the spot and passed it on to the South Manchurian Railway Co., who put it into execution.

Q Do you think the network of railways in Manchuria was sufficient for the attack on the U.S.S.R. in 1941?

p. 21 A Yes, it was, especially the dense strategic network at the eastern front. The railway could secure the force in the central part of Manchuria and it was possible to transfer it quickly and whenever it was necessary, to places in trouble in the front area of Manchuria and the U.S.S.R. And we were able to transfer the forces from one place to another promptly by this network in time of war.

Q Was it at the request of the Operations Department of the General Staff?

A Yes, it was at the request of the Operations Department in the General Staff.

Q What kinds of Operations Plan against the U.S.S.R. were made by the General Staff and the Staff of the Kwantung Army before 1941?

A The General Staff and the Staff of the Kwantung Army carried out all the preparations of war against the U.S.S.R. and had the plans of war.

Q Were they offensive plans?

A Yes, they were.

p. 22 Q Tell me what you know about the "Ken-Toku-En" plan.

A It provided for the increase of our military strength in Manchuria in connection with the outbreak of the Russo-German War in 1941, and by this plan some three hundred thousand forie were transfered to Manchuria. The "Ken-Toku-En" plan was only the name to camouflage our plan of operations against the U.S.S.R.

Q What was the order which had relation to the construction of railway based on the "Ken-Toku-En" plan?

A I don't know, but I think there was no order concerning the construction of railway.

Q So was it the approval of the completion of the preparation against the U.S.S.R. concerning the construction of the railway that caused the plan?

A Yes, it was.

Q How many kilometres long were the Manchurian Railways in 1931?

p. 23 A They were 4,450 kilometers at that time.

Q And in 1941?

A They were about 11,000 kilometers long.

Q What field of operation had the sufficient network for the war against the U.S.S.R.?

A The strategic network in the field of operations in the Maritime Province was sufficient for the operation against the U.S.S.R.

Q How many lines led to the Maritime Provinces border of the U.S.S.R.?

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Q How many lines led to the Maritime Provinces border of the U.S.S.R.?

A There are eight lines, which start from Yuki (Korea), Tsumcutzu, Suifuho, Tungon, Panchei ho, Futow and Tan Pichen. As the Hsia Chientzu-Michan-Futow line runs along the borders, the forces can detrain at any place where operations are required.

Q How about the lines for Blagoveshchensk and Zabaikalye?

p. 24 A There are two lines to Blagoveshchensk, they are the Harbin-Feien-Feiho line, and the Chichihærk-Nouni-Feihe line. As for Zabaikalye district we have also two lines, they are the 'old East China Line', and the Paichangtze-Holoruærshan-Handagai Line. These lines are suitable for carrying troops promptly for operation in the neighbourhood of Chita and the outer Mongolian Republics.

Q The witness knows that the railway must secure the transportation capacity of troops which were going to carry out operation in the Chita district, toward Chichihærh district, foreseeing that the plan of the offensive operation against the U.S.S.R. must be changed as for the disposition of the troops after the attack of the Maritime district. Then did the network secure the transportation capacity of the troops which were necessary for the carrying out of the second stage operation against the U.S.S.R.?

p. 25 A Yes, the transportation of the troops might be done promptly. The condition of railway made the troops possible to concentrate promptly to Tsitsihar district from those districts in Manchuria and China, but advance towards the further westwards, that is to say, Hailærk and Handagai, was late because of the condition of the railway. The imperfection of the railway in the western district was caused chiefly by the lying of the zone of Tchingan Mountains. If there is no such a cause the railway in this same district might have been developed more greatly.

Q How many days were necessary to transfer the No. 2 and 5 Army from Laitime Province direction to Tsitsihar district?

A The number of divisions of the 2 and 5 Army is 10 divisions (about 400 trains are necessary to transport) and for the attached artillery divisions

and tank brigades and troops in rear (about 400 trains)--for these, 800 trains are necessary in all. And so the concentration near Tsitsihar would be accomplished for twenty days using the following lines mixed 40 trains a day.

LINE	Numbers of Trains in a day
Old East China line	20
The Futow-Tugen-Rinkou- Chiamussu-Suihua-Paian- Tsitsihar line	8
Tungning-Tumen-Kirin-Changchun- Paichengtzu line	12

Q Was the network completed to transport the forces which were decided by the plan of war against the U.S.S.R. to Manchuria promptly from North China just before or in the time of the war against the U.S.S.R.?

A For this transportation via the Tientsin-Chinhsien line, twenty trains a day and via the Peipin-Changte-Yehpeishou-Tsien-Fsinlitun-Tungliao line, 5 trains a day might be used and according to circumstances if necessary 6 trains a day from Peipin to Kalgan or its west can be used to the transportation of troops.

Q How many days it takes to transport 5 divisions to near Tsitsihar and the same divisions to near Chungchun from China?

p. 27 A To carry five divisions to Chungchun from North China via Tientsin-Chinhsien-Mukden line, about 200 trains are necessary, and to carry five divisions to near Tsitsihar via Tientsin-Chinhsien-Mukden-Ssupiengkai-Paichengtzu from North China, about 200 trains are necessary. So 400 trains are necessary in all. The above two lines transport capacity is twenty trains a day. Using the Peipin-Changte-Yehpeishou-Tsien-Fsinlitun-Tungliao-Changchiatun-Paichengtzu-Tsitsihar line and the Changchiatun-Ssupiengkai-Changchun line at the same time and using 5 trains a day, we can conclude to transport 400 transport trains for 16 days.

Q How many days does it take to transfer the main forces of the 2nd Army Group from Blegoveshchensk to near Tsitsihar?

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A For this transportation via the Tientsin-Chinhsien line, twenty trains a day and via the Peipin-Changte-Yehpaishou-Tsien-Hsinlitun-Tungliao line, 5 trains a day might be used and according to circumstances if necessary 6 trains a day from Peipin to Kalgen or its west can be used to the transportation of troops.

Q How many days it takes to transport 5 divisions to near Tsitsihar and the same divisions to near Chungchun from China?

p. 27 A To carry five divisions to Chungchun from North China via Tientsin-Chinhsien-Mukden line, about 200 trains are necessary, and to carry five divisions to near Tsitsihar via Tientsin-Chinhsien-Mukden-Ssupiengkai-Paichengtzu from North China, about 200 trains are necessary. So 400 trains are necessary in all. The above two lines transport capacity is twenty trains a day. Using the Peipin-Changte-Yehpaishou-Tsien-Hsinlitun-Tungliao-Chongchiatun-Paichengtzu-Tsitsihar line and the Chongchiatun-Ssupiengkai-Changchun line at the same time and using 5 trains a day, we can conclude to transport 400 transport trains for 16 days.

Q How many days does it take to transfer the main forces of the 2nd Army Group from Blagoveshchensk to near Tsitsihar?

- p. 28 A It would take 15 days to transfer completely the main forces of the 2nd Army Group, that is five divisions (200 trains), and the attached artilleries, tank corps, correspondence corps and rear-guards and so on (100 trains), using totally 300 trains, that is 15 trains a day via Heiho-Peian-Tsitsihar line and Heiho-Peian-Harbin-Tsitsihar line, and 5 trains a day via Liishen-Shanshenfu-Huolungmen-Munkiang-Tsitsihar line at the same time, namely using 20 trains a day.
- Q Was there any railway construction going on during the period of 1941 to 45?
- A Yes, the work for doubling the tracks was in progress.
- Q What railways?
- A The work for doubling the tracks of those lines were carried out; the Harbin-Mutankiang-Suiyang line, Mutankiang-Linkou-Tunagn line, the Changchun-Harbin line, the Mukden-Antung line and the Mukden-Chinhsien-Shanhaikwan line.
- p. 29 Q Was the Huolungmen-Heiho line constructed?
- A Yes, it was opened to traffic from Huo-lungmen to Liishen, in 1943.
- Q Was the said railway in concert with the plan of war against the U.S.S.R. in 1942 and 43?
- A Yes, I think the construction of the railway was carried out basing on the plan of war against the U.S.S.R. in 1942 and 43.
- Q From and to what time were you the commander of the Kwantung defending army?
- A From November 1941 to 26th December 1942. It was for one year and one month.
- Q How did you want to deploy the Kwantung defending army by the plan of operations in 1941 and 42?
- A The Kwantung defending Army took the part of the rear defence while the First Army Group and next the Second or Third Army Groups were delivering an attack against the U.S.S.R.

p. 30 Q From what time to what time were you the commander of the Fourth Army?

A It was from December 1942 to February 1944. It was for one year and two months.

Q To what Army Group was the Fourth Army attached?

A Till November 1943, it was attached to the Second Army Group and after that it was attached to the third Army Group. The headquarters of the Second Army Group (it was changed to the Third Army Group afterwards) was in Tsitsihar.

Q Who is the commander of the Second Army Group?

A The commander of the Second Army Group is General ANANI Korechika, and the Chief of Staff is Major General MATANABE.

Q How was the Second Army Group organized?

A It was organized by the Fourth and Sixth armies.

Q Was there any time when the headquarters of three Army Groups, that is, the headquarters of the First, Second and Third Army Group, were in Manchuria at the same time? If there was, when?

p. 31 A No, there was no time when they were in Manchuria at the same time. When the headquarters of the Second Army Group was diverted to the south battle front, the Third Army Group was organized.

Q Who was the commander of the Third Army Group?

A The commander of the Third Army Group was General OKABE Naosaburo till August 1944, and after that it was General USHIROKU Jun.

Q How was the organization and the position of the Fourth Army in the first half part of 1943?

A The headquarters of the Fourth Army was in Sunwu. On the First Division, its Commander was Lieutenant-General NAKAZAWA and its headquarters was in Sunwu. On the Fifty-seventh Division, its commander was Lieutenant-General UEMURA and its headquarters was in Shanshenfu. The headquarters of the First Artillery and the Artillery Intelligence Regiment were in Sunwu, the First Regiment of the Heavy Field Artillery was in Shenyutun, and the Independent Heavy Artillery Regiment was in Peian. The tank

p. 32 corps was in Sunwu. The headquarters of the second engineer was in Furelki. Frontier guard units were directly subordinated to the commander of the Fourth Army.

Q With how many divisions was the Fourth Army organized in war time?

A The scheduled plan was that in war time the Fourth Army should be doubled than in peace time. That is it was to be extended to four divisions and one tank brigade.

Q Did you know the plan of operations of the Second Army Group and the Fourth Army?

A Yes, I did, and it was the offensive plan.

Q Tell me about the contents of the plan of operations of the Second Army Group and the Fourth Army from 1941 to 1944?

A According to the plan of 1941, reported and explained by the Chief of the Staff of the Fourth Army Major General KILIVIRA, the early concentrated attack of the war against the U.S.S.R. was to be carried out by the First Army Group in the Maritime Province, and during this time the Second Army Group was to cover the flank of the First Army Group and to prepare for the plan of operations in the districts of Zavitaya and Kuibyshevka. In preliminary stage of a war, the N Army and airforces which had operated before in the Maritime Province were to be transferred to the 2nd Army Group. According to the plan of operations of the authorities, the Second Army Group was to let the Fourth Army (four divisions) cross the Heilungkian River from the place between Shengwuton and Aigun and to let the N Army (two divisions) cross it from the place near Chike, and let these two Armies carry out the attack against the Zavitaya and Kuibyshevka, cut off the Heilungkiang Railway, destroy the Army of the U.S.S.R., occupy the important points of Blagoveshchensk, Kuibyshevka, Zavitaya and Simanovskaya, and then advance to the direction of Khabarovsk and Rukhlovo. In September, 1942, the commander of the Second Army Group, General ANANI Korechika intended this plan. Major-General KILIVIRA participated in this sub-plan of operations. According to this sub-plan, the Second Army Group was to let the Fourth Army (four divisions) cross the Heilungkian River from

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the front of Teyinshan and Sentaoka, cut off the Heilungkian Railway; occupy Svobodny and Kuibyshevka and advance to Khabarovsk." During this time the Eighth Army (one and a half division) was to cross the river from Fume, and advance to Rukhlovo along the railroad and occupy it. Those plans of operations of the Second Army Group was in force from 1941 to the spring of 1944, that is the time when I was the commander of the Fourth Army, this plan was in force. I don't know other plans of operations of the Second Army Group. The headquarters of the Third Army Group which took the place of the headquarters of the Second Army Group did not change the above mentioned plan of operations in 1943.

Q Do you know about the offensive movement in the district of Chita at the next stage of war?

A No, I don't know.

Q By whom was the offensive plan of operations against the U.S.S.R. in 1941-42 and -43 decided?

A It was decided by the Chief of the General Staff SUGIYAMA Gen; the Minister of War TOJO Hideki and the Commander of the Kwantung Army UMEZU Yoshijiro.

Q What kind of the preparation was carried out in Blagoveshchensk and Kuibyshevka to make the plan of operations in 1941-42 and -43 succeed?

p. 36 A

In 1943, Sunwu-Shenshunfu-Fume military road was completed. The military road between Sunwu and Chike was completed in 1941 and Japan began to construct the roads which lead to the main points of the passage of a river. Only the road bed construction was operated and in 1943, the road bed between Sunwu and Sunho (about 50 kilometers long) and the one between Suanghsia and Tuanlich (about 50 kilometers long) were constructed. Those military roads were camouflaged against the territory of the U.S.S.R. in the other shore, and among the main points of a passage of a river, the road construction of those parts which can be seen from the other shore was not operated.

Q Was there any preparation of the line of communication for liaison?

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Q Was there any preparation of the line of communication for liaison?

A Yes, the Fourth Army had the military telegraphs and telephones. Telephone wire was constructed in 1942 and '43 and secured the liason to Farbin and Tsitsihar, and at the same time telegraph wire was constructed.

Q Were there any preparations for the storage of food and ammunition?

p. 37 A The storage of the ammunition and food for the operation of the first stage of war were finished on the whole.


Q What was TOJO's and UMEZU's position in the preparation of war against the U.S.S.R.?

A TOJO, as the minister of war, suggested and made the "K-n-Toku-En" plan with the Chief of the General Staff SUGIYAMA Gen and the Commander of the Kwantung Army UMEZU Koshijiro. They developed their preparation to the condition of being able for the Kwantung Army to advance to the territory of the U.S.S.R. in 1941, and as the main supporter of the Japanese-Germany Military Alliance against the U.S.S.R., devoted all their power to the preparation of war. I don't know whether they planned the occupation of the Maritime Province in the first stage of war or not, and at the same time about their plan of next stage.


p. 38

It is testified that the answers in this interrogation were written in Japanese by the witness himself, Lieutenant-General KUSABA Tetsumi. I.J.A. interrogator: Colonel IVANOV, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at International Military Tribunal in Tokyo. Interpreter: Second Lieutenant PETROV.

The Military Sketch of the Accessory programme
for the Offensive plan of operations of the Second
Army Group in 1942 and 43.



A military sketch of the Chief of programme
for the Offensive Plan of Operations of the Second
Army Group in 1941, 42, and 43.



C E R T I F I C A T E

The undermentioned Lieutenant-General KUSABA Tatsumi swore to make true statements about the main war criminals as the witness to Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Colonel of Justice IVANOV, and gave this certificate to them. He was warned that he would be responsible under Art. No. 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.S.R. if he made any false statements.

KUSABA tatsumi

The receiver of this acknowledgement, Assistant Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. at the International War Tribunal, Tokyo.